There is little question that the intent of Congress was fairly well established during the mid 1970s.3 Both Carter and Reagan have been charged with implementing laws that call for consideration of the human rights practices of recipient governments when determining the amount of military and economic assistance they will receive. Congress declined to tie the president's hands completely, however, by including escape clauses in individual pieces of legislation that allow aid to continue in the event of undefined "extraordinary circumstances." As we shall see, these clauses have been used liberally by both administrations to introduce a variety of concerns other than human rights into the foreign aid distribution decision making process.
The operational definition of human rights used for this analysis is based on that found in legislation such as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 which singles out "consisternt pattern[s] of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" for action, identifying such violations as "torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person." 4 Following the congressional lead, we focus our attention on threats to the person, particularly extralegal execution, disappearance, torture, and political imprisonment. These abuses are of an ex-traordinarily gross character, exact a frighteningly high human cost, and tend to be relatively flagrant, thereby making them visible and likely targets for concerted United States action. In doing so, however, we do not deny the importance of other abuses, such as the denial of fundamental political, social, and economic rights or necessities.
I. THE REAGAN CRITIQUE AND REFORMULATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
The Reagan critique and reformulation of United States human rights policy has had two principle currents. First, international terrorism has been introduced as a key human rights concern. Second, the moral issues involved in judging the relative "goodness" of regimes have been clarified. Both currents operate to redirect attention towards the Soviet Union and its allies.
From the start of their administration of United States foreign policy, Reagan and his advisors were particularly interested in international terrorism, which they defined as anti-state attacks, and in identifying international terrorism as a human rights concern. In his first news conference as Secretary of State, Alexander Haig declared that, "[i]nternational terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern, because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights." 5 Haig also repeatedly condemned the Soviet Union for "training, funding and equipping" international terrorists, thereby demonstrating a link between international terrorism and the Soviet Union.6 By identifying international terrorism as the most significant threat to human rights, and by further identifying the Soviet Union as the chief source of international terrorism, it was possible to bundle human rights, national security, and international terrorism into a single package that fit neatly (and subtly) into the broader United States fight against global communism.
The administration also attempted to clarify the moral issues involved in evaluating the human rights practices of various regimes. This served, on the one hand, as the basis for criticizing the Carter policy, and, on the other, as the foundation for a more "realistic" human rights policy. The Reagan critique was enunciated most consistently and clearly by Jeane Kirkpatrick when she was United States Ambassador to the United Nations.7 Kirkpatrick argued that the Carter policy was flawed from the start due to its "purist" or "utopian" conception of human rights. More particularly, she criticized the policy as it was practiced for a lack of effectiveness and for focusing solely on United States allies. Publicly criticizing and denying aid to "friendly" human rights violators was not effective, she argued, because it delegitimized them, thereby making these allies more susceptible to unfriendly opposition groups. Moreover, public criticism and denial of aid made these allies less susceptible to United States influence and pressure. Making the situation worse still in her eyes, the policy was "almost invariably anti-Western in its application."8 It was argued that the Carter human rights policy worked to destabilize and undermine American allies around the world. In sum, therefore, the Reagan critique concluded that the Carter policy effectively promoted neither human rights nor United States security interests. At the heart of the Reagan critique is an entire reformulation of the moral issues surrounding the human rights issue. The Carter policy was fundamentally misdirected because of the inappropriateness of its "purist" conception of human rights. Michael Novak, the Reagan administration's appointee to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, has argued that the fundamental problem was that the Carter administration "pretended that all nations erred against human rights more or less equally. No distinction was made between totalitarian nations and authoritarian nations." 9 It is this, identified-by Novak as the "most important distinction of the twentieth century," that provides what the Reagan administration considers the basis for a proper conception of human rights and lies at the heart of any realistic human rights policy. 10 The theoretical backdrop for the administration's position on the distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism is an article written by Kirkpatrick for Commentary magazine in 1979. At the heart of the argument is a truly extraordinary statement, as follows:
Traditional autocrats leave in place existing allocations of wealth, power, status and other resources which in most traditional societies favor an affluent few and maintain masses in poverty. But they worship traditional gods and observe traditional taboos. They do not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of residence, habitual patterns of family and personal relations. Because the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people who, growing up in the society, learn to cope, as children born to untouchables in India acquire the skills and attitudes necessary for survival in the miserable roles they are destined to fill. Such societies creatd no refugees. Leaving aside the accuracy of this view for the moment, the argument is that non-democratic governments are not all the same because of the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. While the latter may be responsible for serious violations of human rights, they are nonetheless preferable to totalitarian regimes. When one couples this with a "realistic" understanding that not all regimes can be perfect, one's policy choices are clarified. It is thus argued that a true human rights policy is one which chooses the lesser over the greater evil; it is a policy which lends support to authoritarian regimes (however grudgingly) in order to minimize the greater evil of totalitarianism.
The policy implications of this approach are brought to light when one understands that the Reagan administration regarded authoritarian regimes, by definition, as those regimes friendly to the United States, while totalitarian regimes were, by definition, those friendly to the Soviet Union.12 As a result, the Reagan administration could assert that human rights interests and United States security interests were parallel. William Clark, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, highlighted this linkage when he argued that, "[t]he administration believes that a strong America-an America whose national security is assured-is good for personal liberties throughout the world."13 In practice, this requires the United States to support pro-Western non-democratic regimes actively, however repressive they may be. As explained by former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the "first imperative" of a human rights policy "is to strengthen the United States, its allies and friends, the main safeguard against totalitarian aggression. 14 The Reagan administration's reformulation of human rights policy thus included a broad critique of its perception of the Carter policy, and an expo- The scale is included for consideration nonetheless, despite its questionable successs, because it is the only significant attempt to date to measure comprehensively the rights in which we are interested. Beyond this, it seemed worthwhile to include the scale in the analysis due to the respect that the Freedom House organization continues to enjoy within United States political institutions. Overall, however, we do realize that the civil rights scale is methodologically the weakest and least desirable of our measures.
Our second and third indices, in which we are far more interested, were constructed from existing raw data. We took as our starting point a "political In the construction of each index, we scaled the data presented in the reports as if they were accurate and complete. Thus, any biases exhibited in the annual reports of the two organizations should be evident in the indices. Given their particular focus on the rights of the person, these two indices more accurately reflect our interests, and the analyses using these measures will therefore be our principle concern. We are reasonably comfortable with the results because of the high level of intercoder reliability in constructing these indices. While they provide us with ordinal measures only, we are confident that the nations that are scored as having the highest rankings are those nations which in the reports of our two sources are responsbile for higher numbers of deaths, torture, and political imprisonment than those below them, and that the study can be replicated.
In sum, the three scales we employ have been developed from sources with different political motives and assumptions. While none of the scales would (or should) satisfy all readers, taken collectively they provide an interesting and very useful data set. Since our purpose is to test if evaluations of countries' human rights records are correlated with the level of foreign assistance they receive, it will be intriguing to find if one of these "realities" better accords with the rhetoric and reality of policy than do the others. Further, if the parallel analyses generate similar findings regardless of political assumptions, we feel justified in a reasonable degree of confidence that political concerns have not skewed our analysis.
B. The Carter "Initiative"
In order to determine the accuracy of Reagan's characterization of Carter's human rights policy, as well as the degree to which the Reagan human rights policy differs, it is necessary to examine the actual characteristics of Carter's policy. After looking at the publicly stated policy of the Carter administration, we will then examine the empirical evidence. From the start of his administration Carter spoke frequently and forcefully in support of human rights and their central role in the formation of United States foreign policy. He was also generally supportive of Congressional efforts to codify human rights concerns.23 In his inaugural address, the President emphasized his commitment saying, "Our commitment to human rights must be absolute .... Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom-elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clearcut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights."24
There can be little doubt that Mr. Carter was both politically and personally committed to human rights. According to the Reagan critique, in fact, the Carter administration was so strongly, indeed "single-mindedly" committed to human rights, that it doggedly criticized United States allies and denied them needed assistance. Increasingly, however, analysts have questioned whether the Carter human rights policy actually was implemented with consistency and that, in practice, the Carter policy was remarkably similar to the Nixon-Ford policy.25 In short, some contend that the Carter policy was long on rhetoric and short on action. Despite our earlier analysis, the results in Table 1 remain surprising.28 Regardless of how one measures human rights, the correlations with both military and economic aid are, at best, very small. None of the correlations are significant at the .05 level and none are meaningful. Furthermore, the relationships are not consistently negative, as an active human rights policy would require. In many cases there is a positive relationship between aid and human rights violations: the more abusive a state was, the more aid it received. Clearly the Carter policy and existing legislation require a negative relationship which is not evidenced in these data regardless of which scale is employed in the analysis.
It appears that the Carter human rights policy was far less "singleminded" than the Reagan administration has portrayed it. While Carter and other administration spokespersons repeatedly raised the spector of aid termination, the stick was actually used very sparingly. Over the course of the four years Carter was in office, security assistance was cut off in only eight cases: Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Para- guay, and Uruguay.29 Of obvious importance is the fact that all eight of these cases were in Latin America. Clearly, if the Carter policy had an impact, it was in Latin America. The extent of this impact and the reasons behind it will be discussed in some detail in the conclusion below. It is important to note here, however, that even in these few cases the Carter commitment was something less than "absolute." The stronger State Department foreign assistance correlations merit some discussion because they are the only significant correlations discovered over the entire six year period. First, the State Department reports are meants to be the basis upon which executive decisions are made concerning aid distribution questions. Thus, to the extent that the correlations are negative and significant, the Reagan administration is acting in a manner consistent with the reports and existing statutes. In this regard, then, the Reagan administration has demonstrated more consistency than the Carter administration.
Although this greater apparent consistency may be the result of bringing aid distribution into line with the reports, it could also result from bringing the reports into line with desired aid distributions. The objectivity of the State Department country reports has increasingly been questioned over the last several years.32 While we have no basis for judging the overall objectivity of the State Department reports here, the fact that the 1982 and 1983 Freedom House and Amnesty International correlations exhibit little or no change from the 1981 figures, while the State Department correlations alone change significantly, would seem to raise some questions about the latter figures' validity. When three disparate sources exhibit the same pattern for the initial four years examined, and only one scale deviates in the fifth and sixth years, it is likely that it resulted from the preparation and reporting of data rather than from an actual policy change. As noted earlier, in constructing our human rights scales we did not challenge the information in the reports, but simply accepted or assumed the validity of the descriptions and ranked the countries accordingly.33 Therefore, any biases in the reports are also reflected in our scales.
In practice, then, the Reagan human rights policy regarding aid distribution does not appear, overall, to be significantly different from the Carter human rights policy. This fact would, no doubt, surprise ranking members of both administrations. At no point during either administration does it appear from our analysis that human rights concerns significantly influenced the distribution of United States foreign assistance, whether it be military or economic aid. Thus, it was not surprising to discover that the best predictor of the distribution of aid in any given year is the distribution in the previous year. ... the County Reports for 1983 suffer from political bias. This is evident in the language that is used to describe sources of information about human rights abuses and in the context that is set for the discussion of abuses. In various countries that are aligned with the United States, ..., the Country Reports discuss abuses largely in terms of "allegations," "charges," or "claims". . .even when the evidence that has been compiled about abuses is overwhelming. individual states have resulted in far more casualities. In human terms, then, international terrorism has been far less costly than state repression. Given the relative gravity of the two threats, it is difficult to understand how terrorism could be viewed objectively as the more serious violation of human rights. Reagan's human rights rhetoric has changed over the course of his tenure in office. Several observers have argued that the authoritariantotalitarian distinction and the terrorism aspects of the rhetoric have been dropped by the administration. While it is true that the frequency with which these elements are discussed has declined over time, it is not at all clear that they have lost their importance within the administration. The reasons behind the reduced emphasis on these aspects of the rhetorical package appear two-fold. First, the purpose of the rhetoric was to justify changes in policy to both domestic and foreign audiences. One would then expect, quite naturally, that it would be given greatest public emphasis at the start of the administration, and would then receive less attention in the years that followed. Secondly, the rhetorical arguments ran into political opposition that required that they be played down. As noted above, the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes was opposed from a variety of quarters, and the administration was countered by its own CIA in its efforts to identify terrorism as the most grievous violation of human rights. Neither of these developments, however, necessarily mean that these aspects of the rhetorical package are no longer accepted within the administration as accurate and as a practical guide in decisionmaking. In fact, one finds that both elements of the rhetoric are still discussed explicitly on occasion37 and, far more frequently, are implied by administration spokespersons.38 It appears, simply, that in response to political pressures, the administration has dropped what are now buzzwords for the opposition and explains the conceptual origins of its policy less frequently.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS RHETORIC AND ACTION

Perhaps the point made most clearly by these results is that there is a gulf between human rights rhetoric and human rights action in United States
Overall, then, the rhetoric of the Reagan human rights policy appears strained. Our analysis has seriously questioned the Reagan interpretation and critique of the Carter policy, and there are significant logical flaws with the authoritarian-totalitarian distinction and the argument that international terrorism represents the greatest abuse of human rights. But, as was noted much earlier, the various aspects of the rhetoric do fall together quite neatly, and do direct human rights concerns towards the Soviet Union and its allies. 
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For an administration sincerely committed to the reassertion of American strength, such rhetoric thus has a clear utility.
B. The Reagan Administration's Human Rights Policy in Action
Turning to the actions of the Reagan administration, the evidence indicates that very little was done in the way of redirecting the distribution of United States foreign assistance. As in the Carter administration, the distribution of aid has had very little to do with the level of respect for human rights in recipient nations. This apparent contradiction of the law is generally explained in either of two ways. The most common is the invocation of the "extraordinary circumstances" escape clause. These circumstances remain undefined in the human rights legislative package, and thus may be defined by the executive as broadly as it wishes, a point to which we will return shortly. Secondly, the administration has justified its behavior through a creative interpretation of the legislative language calling for United States action in cases exhibiting a "consistent pattern of gross violations." While accepting that there are gross violations of human rights in a number of countries which it actively supports, the administration has argued either that the violations are not consistent or that they do not represent a pattern, and thus the law does not apply. 39 The upshot of all of this, of course, is that the Reagan administration, like the Carter administration, has not denied foreign assistance in the manner called for by Congressional statutes. The extraordinary circumstances clause found in most human rights legislation has been used by both administrations to introduce a variety of concerns to the foreign aid decision making process. The inclusion of such a clause represents at least the tacit recognition on the part of Congress that concerns other than human rights may impinge upon foreign aid decisions. As in other policy areas, decision maker frequently seek to achieve a variety of diverse goals with the foreign aid policy instrument. Beyond human rights concerns, decision makers may also seek to achieve or improve political objectives, military security, and/or economic management or efficiency. There is also, of course, the problem of bureaucratic and budgetary inertia. pressures and concerns. It is clear from the passage of such a broad human rights legislative package, however, that the Congress feels that considerable weight should be given to human rights concerns vis-a-vis these other concerns. What we have found in our analysis, of course, is that in the final instance both the Carter and Reagan administrations have either preferred or felt compelled to pursue one or more of these other interests with the foreign aid instrument. In the competition among these various interests, there are but a few cases in which the human rights concern has been judged compelling. In the vast majority of instances, some combination of "other interests" has been judged more important than the promotion of human rights. While this finding is the most central to our analysis and points out an important similarity between the two administrations, it is nevertheless true that the manner in which these interests are juggled point us towards a significant difference between the administrations.
There is no question that President Carter and many of his top appointees were sincerely committed to the cause of human rights. Yet, we have found that this concern was only rarely deemed compelling in foreign aid decisions. Stephen Cohen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Security Assistance during the Carter administration, has explained how the administration weighted the various concerns relevant to foreign aid distribution. He notes that the administration adopted a very liberal interpretation of the extraordinary circumstances clause, and thus, except in regard to a number of Latin American countries, always found that extraordinary interests existed. Apparently, the administration required some, though very little, argument and substantiation to invoke the clause. As Cohen explains it, "The Administration did require some showing of a substantial and specific interest before the exception for extraordinary circumstances was available. A mere desire for cordial relations, without more, was never held sufficient.... However, once a specific interest of some substantiality was cited, the exception was usually invoked." 40 Examples of specific interests cited by Cohen include countries close to the Soviet Union or Soviet allies, those with U.S. military bases, those who were members in pro-Western security organizations, and those with major resources used in the United States. Obviously, these and similar arguments can be made for virtually all United States aid recipients. Apparently, the only region for which such arguments could not be mustered was Latin America. This point is confirmed by Cohen who explains why each of those few countries in which aid was terminated was in Latin America. 41 It seems clear that despite its commitment to human rights, the Carter administration was never actually willing to wager a potential political or security risk in favor of human rights. It is important to consider the implications of this point. Even an administration that made an ideological and moral commitment to human rights found it easy to give consistently greater priority to more traditional and "hard-nosed" concerns. Nevertheless, the Carter policy had a positive impact as regards Latin America. In the absence of any perceived security risks to the United States, the Cater administration was willing to emphasize human rights concerns over what may have been diplomatic or economic interests. Thus, while an examination of the weight given competing claims in foreign aid decision making indicates that in most instances the Carter and Reagan Administrations acted similarly, one may find subtle differences. While the Carter administration was willing to pursue human rights concerns in Latin America, the Reagan administration has apparently found other interests more compelling. Shortly after assuming office, President Reagan removed the bans on several forms of aid to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. He more recently lifted the arms embargo against Guatemala, and he has repeatedly floated the idea of resuming foreign assistance to Guatemala as well. Thus, in short, it appears that the policy makers in the Carter admin'istration did give greater weight to human rights than to.many other non-security related concerns. In this, they stand apart from the Reagan policy makers that followed them. But again, the overriding fact is that both administrations always found security interests more important than human rights concerns when they were seen to be in competition. This similarity fundamentally shaped their foreign assistance decisions, and thus one does not find significant overall differences in the human rightsforeign assistance relationship in the two administrations.
As noted in the introduction, it may not be altogether fair to judge the Reagan administration according to criteria which it disapproves. Despite the reasonable clarity of Congressional intent, the administration has consistently stated that it did not approve of the use of foreign assistance in the manner prescribed by human rights legislation.42 It has argued that the instruments of a human rights policy should be chosen according to the criterion of effectiveness, and that "in the majority of cases this criterion suggests an emphasis on traditional diplomacy."43 The administration has consistently promoted the use of traditional quiet diplomacy or constructive engagement. Thus, in concluding, it might be useful and interesting to exam- has been particularly active, such as El Salvador or South Africa, the situation does not appear encouraging. Despite the Reagan administration's best efforts in El Salvador, there is little reason to believe that the condition of human rights has improved substantially.47 In fact, the only thing that has appeared to influence the behavior of the Salvadoran military is the proximity of the next Congressional review of its respect for human rights-the threat of aid termination.48 And in South Africa, where the policy of constructive engagement has been most extensively promoted, there is also little reason for optimism. The South Africans remain entrenched in Namibia, many thousands of native blacks continue to be relocated to homelands, and arbitrary arrests and imprisonments continue unabated. 49 Finally, it might also be useful to consider the effectiveness of each policy in terms of its impact upon the victims of these regimes. Michael Walzer has rightly encouraged all of us to give some thought and sympathy to "the tortured dissidents, the imprisoned oppositionists, the threatened minorities, all the 'disappeared' and murdered men and women of all the tyrannies, old and new." 50 This is of course prudent advice; we should never lose sight of those who suffer most. It is in this area that the Carter policy was perhaps most successful. Upon emerging from the depths of the repressive machinery of the former Argentine regime, Jacobo Timerman publicly expressed his gratitude for Carter and his human rights policy, saying, "Those of us who were imprisoned, those who are in prison still, will never forget President Carter and his contribution to the battle for human rights."-s Whatever else may be said about the Carter policy, the rhetoric pursued did mitigate a degree of the loneliness that must be felt by each human rights victim. It also raised the world's consciousness of human rights, and thus provided a measure of hope for the victims. In sum, United States foreign policy under both Presidents Carter and Reagan has been characterized by a sharp distinction between the rhetoric and the reality of human rights policy. Moreover, there is a sharp difference in the rhetoric of the two administrations. We have seen that the rhetorical aspects of the Reagan critique and reformulation of human rights policy have demonstrated empirical and logical flaws. In contrast, the practice of the Carter and Reagan Administrations on foreign aid distribution has been remarkably similar. Neither administration has acted in accordance with the established human rights legislative package. Thus, while the Reagan administration has produced a rhetoric on human rights policy that is radically different from that of the Carter administration, the policy outputs in the area of foreign assistance are not any more coherent. Decisions on the distribution of United States foreign assistance continue to be made with interests other than human rights in mind. While Carter's policy may have failed while raising expectations, Reagan's policy offers no hope whatsoever. 
